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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kevin Christian Overline appeals following his convictions after a jury trial for 
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, sexual abuse of a child under the age of 
sixteen years, and possession of sexually exploitive material. Mr. Overline asserts that 
the district court committed fundamental, structural error when it excluded the public 
from portions of his jury trial, and abused its discretion when it imposed excessive 
sentences and denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Overline was charged by Indictment with one count each of lewd conduct 
with a minor under sixteen, sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years, and 
possession of sexually exploitive material. (R., pp.19-20.) The charges stemmed from 
acts purportedly committed by Mr. Overline against AB., the then ten-year-old daughter 
of his live-in girlfriend. (PSI File,1 p.2.) All three crimes arise from pictures that were 
taken of AB.'s genitals, anus, and breasts, with some of the pic{ures showing what 
appear to be a man's hands touching AB.'s body, while she was asleep in her 
bedroom. (Tr., p.260, L.9 - p.273, L.21.) 
The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The public was excluded from 
Mr. Overline's trial during portions of the testimony of two witnesses. The first instance 
occurred during the testimony of the alleged victim, after the prosecutor indicated that 
she would be publishing nude images of the alleged victim purportedly taken by 
1 All references to the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) will be to "PSI File," a 
paginated PDF document containing the PSI and supporting documentation. 
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Mr. Overline. At that point, the following exchange took place between the prosecutor 






So if you're going to publish these, I do want to clear 
the courtroom. 
I think that's just the quickest way to put them on. 
Right. 
The victim-witness coordinator is asking whether she 
needs to go out and/or if she needs to stay. 
That's really up to the witness in this case. If she 
would feel more comfortable with the victim-witness 
coordinator present, then she can have her present. 
(Tr., p.259, L.15 - p.260, L.1.) 
The alleged victim then testified concerning fifteen of the sixty-five photographs 
that were admitted into evidence after the public was excluded from the trial. Nothing in 
the record indicates when (or if), during the cross-examination, redirect, or recross-
examination of the alleged victim that took place immediately after the publication and 
testimony about the photographs, the public was permitted back in the courtroom. 
(Tr., p.260, L.9-- p.277, L.21.) 
The second instance occurred during the testimony of the State's computer 
expert, prior to his display and discussion of nude images of the alleged victim. The 
following exchange then occurred: 
THE COURT: 
[Prosecutor:] 
We - because there's going to be publications [sic] of 
the pictures, all of the parties that are here must 
leave. The public must be excluded. 
Are we ready to bring in the jury? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
[Defense Counsel:] Yes. 
2 
THE COURT: When that is over, then he - the bailiff will go out into 
the hallway to let people know that that's over. 
(Tr., p.345, Ls.6-16.) In neither instance does defense counsel appear to have objected 
to the district court's actions.2 
Mr. Overline was found guilty of all three counts. (R., pp.164-66.) The State 
requested concurrent, unified sentences of twenty years, with six years fixed, on the 
lewd conduct charge, fifteen years, with five years fixed, on the sexual abuse charge, 
and ten years, with five years fixed, on the possession of sexually exploitive material 
charge. (Tr., p.477, Ls.3-10.) Defense counsel requested a rider, with the sentences 
consisting of two or three years fixed with "a longer indeterminate tail[.]" (Tr., p.484, 
Ls.7-16.) The district court imposed concurrent, unified sentences of fifteen years, with 
five years fixed, on the lewd conduct and sexual abuse charges, and a unified sentence 




I'm wondering if I can just publish them personally to 
the jury or we can clear the courtroom out since it is a 
young victim. 
I - I would probably clear - clear the area. I think that 
would make more sense. Is that okay with you? 




Okay. But this isn't like videos or anything like that? 
It's just photographs? 
Photographs. 
And it's up to you whether you want to just publish it 
individually or put it on the overhead. But if you - I 
think if you want to do it on the overhead, that's fine, 
and then we can - we'll just have everybody out. 
(Supp.Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.8, L.11.) 
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of ten years, with five years fixed, on the possession of sexually exploitive material 
charge. (R., pp.185-86.) Mr. Overline filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment 
of conviction. (R., p.191.) 
Mr. Overline then filed a Rule 35 motion, requesting leniency. (R., p.214.) The 
district court gave the defense one month within which to provide supporting 
documentation. (R., p.217.) The defense filed a letter from Mr. Overline within the one 
month period, in which he provided new information in support of his Rule 35 motion. 
The letter explained that he was taking classes at the chapel, attending Saturday and 
Sunday services, that no programming was available until his parole date was closer, 
and that he had a job working at the laundry. He then compared his sentences to those 
received by others who he believed had committed more serious crimes. (R., pp.219-
20.) Ultimately, the district court denied the Rule 35 motion. (R., p.226.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court commit fundamental, structural error in violation of 
Mr. Overline's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when it excluded the public 
from portions of his jury trial? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing excessive sentences? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Overline's Rule 35 




The District Court Committed Fundamental, Structural Error In Violation Of 
Mr. Overline's Sixth Amendment Right To A Public Trial When It Excluded The Public 
From Portions Of His Jury Trial 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Overline asserts that the district court erred when it excluded the public from 
portions of his jury trial without obtaining his informed consent before doing so. 
Although counsel for Mr. Overline did not object to the exclusions, Mr. Overline asserts 
that the error in excluding the public from his trial constitutes fundamental error, and is, 
therefore, reviewable on appeal absent objection. Because denial of the right to a 
public trial is structural error, the prejudice prong of the test announced by this Court in 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) does not apply, and this Court should reverse 
Mr. Overline's convictions without considering whether he can demonstrate specific 
prejudice. Finally, Mr. Overline urges this Court to reject any argument that 
Mr. Overline's counsel could waive his right to a public trial through statements or by his 
conduct. 
B. The District Court Committed Fundamental, Structural Error In Violation Of 
Mr. Overline's Sixth Amendment Right To A Public Trial When It Excluded The 
Public From Portions Of His Trial 
1. The Violation 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part, 
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial[.]" U.S. CONST. amend VI. The Sixth Amendment's public trial guarantee 
has been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In re 
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Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). Excluding the public from even a portion of trial 
proceedings constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment right. See Presley v. 
Georgia, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 721 (2010) (exclusion during voir dire); Waller v. 
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (exclusion during suppression hearing). Violation of the 
right constitutes structural error. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 49-50; State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 222 (2010) (citing Waller). A violation of the right to a public trial is not 
subject to harmless error analysis, and a defendant need not demonstrate specific 
prejudice in order to prevail on appeal. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); 
Waller, 467 U.S. at 49-50. 
The public was excluded from Mr. Overline's jury trial during portions of the 
testimony of two witnesses. The first instance occurred during the testimony of the 
alleged victim, after the prosecutor indicated that she would be publishing images of the 
alleged victim nude purportedly taken by Mr. Overline. At that point, the following 






So if you're going to publish these, I do want to clear 
the courtroom. 
I think that's just the quickest way to put them on. 
Right. 
The victim-witness coordinator is asking whether she 
needs to go out and/or if she needs to stay. 
That's really up to the witness in this case. If she 
would feel more comfortable with the victim-witness 
coordinator present, then she can have her present. 
(Tr., p.259, L.15 - p.260, L.1.) 
The alleged victim then testified concerning fifteen of the sixty-five photographs 
that were admitted into evidence after the public was excluded from the trial. Nothing in 
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the record indicates when (or if), during the cross-examination, redirect, or recross-
examination of the alleged victim that took place immediately after the testimony about 
the photographs, the public was permitted back inside the courtroom. (Tr., p.260, L.9 -
p.277, L.21.) 
The second instance occurred during the testimony of the State's computer 
expert, prior to his discussion of nude images of the alleged victim. The following 
exchange then occurred: 
THE COURT: 
[Prosecutor:] 
That's just the date that's shown. We - because 
there's going to be publications [sic] of the pictures, all 
of the parties that are here must leave. The public 
must be excluded. 
Are we ready to bring in the jury? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
[Defense Counsel:] Yes. 
THE COURT: When that is over, then he - the bailiff will go out into 
the hallway to let people know that that's over. 
(Tr., p.345, Ls.6-16.) In neither instance does defense counsel appear to have objected 
to the district court's actions. 
In Waller, the United States Supreme Court provided the test to be applied 
before a court may exclude the public from any portion of a trial. The Court explained, 
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding 
interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than 
necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable 
alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate 
to support the closure. 
Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. The trial court must consider alternatives even when none are 
offered by the parties. Presley, 130 S. Ct. at 725. 
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Based on the excerpts of the trial set forth above, it cannot be disputed that the 
district court did not conduct the analysis required under Waller, rendering the error 
plain. First, neither the State nor the court identified the prejudice that was likely to 
occur if the courtroom was not closed to the public. 3 Second, the closure was broader 
than necessary to protect any interest, which is evidenced by the fact that the State was 
allowed to choose whether it wanted to publish the photographs to the jury or using an 
overhead projector; it chose to publish them on the overhead because doing so was the 
"quickest way" to present the evidence. (Tr., p.259, L.15 - p.260, L.1.) Third, the 
district court did not consider reasonable alternatives, including privately publishing the 
pictures to the jury or setting up the projector (or using some sort of screen) so as to 
prevent the public from seeing the images during the testimony. Finally, the district 
court made no findings whatsoever, let alone findings sufficient to support the closure of 
the courtroom. 
In Cowles Pub. Co. v. Magistrate Court of the First Judicial Dist. Of State, County 
of Kootenai, 118 Idaho 753 (1990), the Idaho Supreme Court, considering the c1osely-
related First Amendment right4 that implicitly provides the right of the public to attend 
trials, recognized, 
The presumption remains that preliminary hearings in Idaho will remain 
open absent the defendant's requesif5] and an overriding interest in a fair 
3 Appellate counsel accepts that the interest sought to be protected by the State and the 
district court was avoiding displaying the photographs to the public. However, the 
extent to which some sort of prejudice would occur if this interest was not protected is 
not clear. 
4 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Sixth and First Amendment 
guarantees of public access to trials (and related proceedings) are co-extensive. See 
Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 ("there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right 
of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment 
right of the press and the public"). 
5 The Court was considering how a statute, Idaho Code § 19-811, could be construed 
as constitutional in light of the First Amendment right of the public to attend preliminary 
9 
trial. The right to an open public preliminary hearing and trial is a shared 
right of the accused and the public, with the common element and concern 
being the assurance of fairness. 
Id. at 760 (emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized what the Idaho Supreme 
Court did in Cowles: the public trial guarantee is a crucial part of the process that 
ensures a criminal defendant receives a fair trial. See WalJer, 467 U.S. at 46 ("The 
central aim of a criminal proceeding must be to try the accused fairly, and '[o]ur cases 
have uniformly recognized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of 
the defendant."') (brackets in original) (quoting Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 
U.S. 368, 380 (1979». The importance of the right to the fairness of the underlying 
proceeding is a strong indication that counsel did not fail to object for strategic 
purposes, and that any such intention on the part of defense counsel would have been 
unreasonable. 
2. The Right Was Not Waived 
Mr. Overline anticipates that the State will argue that his right to a public trial was 
waived either when his attorney failed to object to the closure of the courtroom, or when, 
at a pre-trial hearing, his attorney said, "That's fine[,]" when the district court announced 
that it intended either to "clear the area" or publish the exhibits privately to the jury. 
(Supp.Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.8, L.11.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has identified three approaches that appellate courts 
have taken when considering how and when the right to a public trial may be waived. 
hearings. Cowles, 118 Idaho at 760. The plain language of the statute requires the 
exclusion of the public "upon the request of the defendant[.]" I.C. § 19-811. 
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State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153 (Utah 1989). The first is that the right is not waived by 
a failure to object. The second is that it is "waived by silence only if the failure to object 
represents an intentional and knowing act by the defendant." The third, which it 
describes as "the apparent majority view," allows for waiver of the right by silence. Id. at 
155. 
Ultimately, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the majority view, reasoning that the 
right to a public trial is different than other rights that require a personal waiver by the 
defendant, such as the right to trial, the right to be present at trial, the right to trial by 
jury, and the right to an interpreter at trial. The Court reasoned, "A unifying 
characteristic of these rights appears to be that they are of central importance to the 
quality of the guilt-determining process and the defendant's ability to participate in that 
process." Id. at 156. In finding the right to a public trial to be different, the Court 
reasoned, recognizing that the right "is important in assuring that abuses by the state 
are not permitted to be hidden from public view[,]" that "the absence of the public in a 
particular case does not necessarily affect qualitatively the guilt-determining process or 
the defendant's ability to participate in the process." Id. 
One reason that this Court should reject the Utah Supreme Court's goal-based 
reasoning is because it predates the analysis of the significance of constitutional trial 
rights adopted by the United States Supreme Court in recent years. Specifically, in 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Court rejected a goal-based approach 
to the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, explaining, 
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds 
with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to 
ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a 
substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but 
that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible 
of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about 
11 
the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little 
dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined. 
Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is 
akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. 
This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes. 
Crawford at 61-62 (emphasis added). Similarly, deciding whether a structural, 
constitutional right can be waived by silence or the conduct of counsel, without the 
defendant being informed of that right, merely because a court has determined that the 
right does not "necessarily affect qualitatively the guilt-determining process" the way 
that a deprivation of the right to a jury trial6 does is the type of goal-based reasoning 
about a procedural right that was rejected in Crawford and which should be rejected by 
this Court. 
Another reason that this Court should reject the reasoning adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court is that it ignores one important reason for the right to a public trial: "a 
public trial encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages perjury." Waller, 
467 U.S. at 46 (discussing this reason as different from the fact that a public trial 
assures that a defendant is dealt with fairly and that the prosecutor and judge "carry out 
their duties responsibly"). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this Court should reject the approach 
taken by the Utah Supreme Court because Idaho case law disfavors finding waivers of 
constitutional rights when they are not clear from the record. See State v. Lopez, 144 
6 The Utah Supreme Court gives no reason or evidence in support of its conclusion that 
the presence or absence of a jury at trial "necessarily affect[s] qualitatively the guilt-
determining process[,]" nor does it explain why the presence or absence of the public at 
a trial is less-important than the right to a jury trial. The Court simply asserts both 
propositions as if they were self-evident. 
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Idaho 349, 352 (Ct. App. 2007) ("A waiver is a voluntary relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege, and courts should indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver") (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)); State v. 
Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 497 (Ct. App. 1987) ("Waiver, in the broad sense, is defined as 
the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. There must be expressed consent or 
affirmative conduct manifesting consent for waiver of a speedy trial. Furthermore, every 
reasonable presumption against waiver must be indulged") (internal citations omitted). 
The United States Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion. See Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("It has been pointed out that courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we 
do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. A waiver is ordinarily 
an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege") (internal 
footnotes, quotation marks, and citations omitted). 
Mr. Overline asserts that this Court should instead adopt the approach taken by 
the Seventh Circuit, which it set forth as follows: 
The Supreme Court has noted, U[t]he Constitution requires that every effort 
be made to see to it that a defendant in a criminal case has not 
unknowingly relinquished the basic protections that the Framers thought 
indispensable to a fair trial." Consequently, "every reasonable 
presumption should be indulged against" waiver of a fundamental trial 
right. This heightened standard of waiver has been applied to plea 
agreements, the right against self-incrimination, the right to a trial, the right 
to a trial by jury, the right to an attorney, and the right to confront 
witnesses. Furthermore, in dealing with the fundamental trial right to 
representation by counsel, the Supreme Court has held that presumption 
of waiver from a silent record is impermissible. 
The common element of the cases mentioned in the paragraph above is 
the fact that the rights with which they deal all concern the fairness of the 
trial. The right to a public trial also concerns the right to a fair trial. So, 
like other fundamental trial rights, a right to a public trial may be 
relinquished only upon a showing that the defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived such a right. 
13 
Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 433-34 (ih Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphases in original); see also Com. v. Edward, 912 N.E. 2d 515,523-24 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2009) ("Notwithstanding its structural character, the right to a public trial, like other 
structural rights, can be waived. Waiver requires a sound rationale for closure and the 
defendant's knowing agreement."); State v. Bone-Club, 906 P.2d 325, 329 (Wash. 
1995) (considering the state constitution's similar public trial guarantee and "dismissing 
the State's argument that Defendant's failure to object freed the trial court from the 
strictures of the closure requirements"). 
Finally, to the extent that defense counsel's statement, "That's fine," at a pre-tiral 
conference amounted to an attempt to waive Mr. Overline's right to a public trial, such a 
waiver must be read as narrowly as possible. See Stuart, 113 Idaho at 497 ("every 
reasonable presumption against waiver [of a constitutional right] must be indulged") 
(internal citations omitted). An examination of the question asked of defense counsel 
reveals that any waiver is not as broad as what the court later did. Specifically, defense 
counsel was asked whether he was okay with the district court's intention to "clear the 
area" or publish the photographs privately to the jury. (Supp.Tr., p.7, L.24 - p.8, L.1.) It 
was only after that statement that the district court, without seeking further input from 
defense counsel, announced that it would "just have everybody out" if the State chose 
to publish the images on the overhead rather than individually to the jury. At no time did 
the district court seek to inform Mr. Overline of his right to a public trial or seek his input. 
(Supp.Tr., p.8, Ls. 7 -11.) 
Considering the importance of the right to a public trial to fairness of the 
proceedings, as recognized by the Seventh Circuit and by this Court in Cowles, this 
Court should adopt the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit, Massachusetts, and 
14 
Washington, and require that the record demonstrate that any waiver of the right be 
knowing and voluntary on the parl of the defendant. For the same reason that a lawyer 
can't waive the right to a jury trial, a lawyer shouldn't be allowed to waive the right to a 
public trial. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Excessive Sentences 
Mr. Overline asserts that, considering the mitigating factors present in his case, 
the district court abused its discretion when it imposed concurrent, unified sentences of 
fifteen years, with five years fixed, on the charges of lewd conduct and sexual abuse, 
and ten years, with five years fixed, on the charge of possession of sexually exploitive 
material. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Overline does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Overline must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992)). The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
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of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered 
as a mitigating factor. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme 
Court reduced a sentence based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial 
court did not give proper consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it 
played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for 
treating the problem." Id. at 91. This Court has also ruled that ingestion of drugs and 
alcohol, resulting in an impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of one's conduct, 
can be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405,414 (1981). 
Mr. Overline admitted to using methamphetamine several times per week over a 
period of twenty years. (PSI File,? p.19.) He has expressed a desire to participate in 
drug treatment. (PSI File, p.20.) At sentencing, defense counsel explained that 
Mr. Overline "related to me that he had been up for approximately four, maybe five days 
. at the time of this incident ... and that he had been doing meth during that time and 
hadn't slept." (Tr., p.480, Ls.12-16.) Mr. Overline confirmed this information when, 
during his PSI, he explained that he was 
"still not sure why I did [it] except I was not thinking very clear [sic] at all 
after being up that many nights without any sleep." He repeated that he 
had been using methamphetamine regularly and not sleeping due to his 
drug use. 
7 The PSI and supporting materials are contained in a PDF file and, for ease of 
reference, citations to their contents will be to "PSI File." 
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(PSI File, p.8.) The psychosexual evaluator concluded that Mr. Overline's 
"inappropriate sexual behavior [with the victim] seemed to be an extension of his 
methamphetamine issues." (PSI File, p.49.) 
Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses 
remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Mr. Overline expressed remorse when, at sentencing, he announced, "I'd like to say I'm 
so very sorry for [the victim]. I never meant to hurt her and I hope some day she can 
forgive me for what I did." (Tr., p.486, Ls.11-13.) During his PSI, Mr. Overline noted, "I 
admit to my crime & take full responsibility." (PSI File, p.20.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that a desire to undergo sex offender 
treatment is a mitigating factor to be considered. See State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 
295-96 (1997) (finding a fixed-life sentence excessive for reasons that included the 
defendant's acceptance of responsibility, including "not blam[ing] the victims in any 
way," desire to undergo sex offender treatment, "desire to change his behavior and 
possibility for rehabilitation"). Mr. Overline is open to treatmeAt, specifically ~ieving 
that "he would benefit from sexual offender treatment" because it would '''help me 
realize how bad things are I did.'" (PSI File, p.45.) According to the psychosexual 
evaluator, Mr. Overline "would pose a low risk to re-offend when compared with other 
sexual offenders, provided he was actively involved in treatment and remained clean 
and sober." (PSI File, p.47.) The psychosexual evaluator noted, "testing suggested 
motivation for treatment[,]" and he was "considered amenable for sexual offender 
treatment at a community based setting, provided he conjointly participated in 
substance abuse treatment." (PSI File, p.50.) 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be 
accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." State v. Hoskins, 131 
Idaho 670,673 (1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also State v. Nice, 103 
Idaho 89, 91 (1982). In both Hoskins and Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court considered, 
among other important factors, that the defendants had no prior felony convictions. 
Hoskins at 673; Nice at 90. Prior to this case, Mr. Overline had not been convicted of a 
felony.8 (PSI File, p.22.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that an important factor in fashioning a 
sentence is whether an offender enjoys the support of family and friends in his 
rehabilitation efforts. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing 
sentence of defendant who, inter alia, had the support of his family in his rehabilitation 
efforts). Mr. Overline enjoys the support of his two adult daughters and his father. (PSI 
File, pp.10-11, 15-16.) One of his daughters told the PSI writer that, if granted 
probation, he could live with her while he got back on his feet. (PSI File, p.12.) 
Mr. Overline asserts that, based on the mitigating factors present in his case, the 
district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to concurrent, unified 
sentences of fifteen years, with five years fixed, on the charges of lewd conduct and 
sexual abuse, and ten years, with five years fixed, on the charge of possession of 
sexually exploitive material. He asserts that the fixed portions of his sentences should 
have been, at most, three years, with the opportunity to complete a rider or be 
suspended while he was allowed to be on probation. 
8 Mr. Overline's prior record shows two misdemeanor convictions: failure to carry a 
license in 1990 and speeding in a work zone in 2008. (PSI File, p.9.) 
18 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Overline's Rule 35 Motion 
In Light Of The New Information Provided 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251,253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987) 
and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447 (Ct. App. 1984)). "The criteria for examining rulings 
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether 
the original sentence was reasonable." Id. (citing Lopez at 450). "If the sentence was 
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in 
view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id. (citing 
State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
The new information provided by Mr. Overline in support of his Rule 35 motion 
was in the form of a letter. In the letter, he explained that he was taking classes at the 
chapel and attending Saturday and Sunday services, that no programming was 
available until his parole date was closer, and that he had a job working at the prison 
laundry. 
Mr. Overline asserts that when this new information is considered along with the 
mitigating factors identified in section II, supra, the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied his Rule 35 motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Overline respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction because the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. 
In the alternative, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce the fixed portions of his 
underlying sentences from five years each to three years each, and order that his 
sentences be suspended while he serves a period of probation. 
DATED this 10th day of February, 2012. 
State Appellate Public Defender 
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